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FAMINE, FAMINE RELIEF AND PUBLIC POLICY IN 
KITUI DISTRICT. 
By 
Joshua J. Akong'a 
ABSTRACT 
It is generally known that famine is both a biological and social 
phenomenon that can be man or naturally caused. As such, it has both physio-
logical and interpersonal implications. In Kitui district of Kenya, famine 
is usually a consequence of drought, though in the past, weavil birds, 
locusts, floods and rinderpest have contributed to the severity of famine there. 
Famine in Kitui district is therefore predominantly environmentally related. 
There are limitations on how much can be planted and harvested since it lies 
in a semi-arid region where drought is a recurrent problem causing acute short-
ages of food, water for human and livestock consumption and pasture. Long 
range subsistance planning is therefore nearly impossible due to the scarcity 
and variability of rainfall. 
In the first part of the paper, thereris a description of memorable, 
therefore culturally significant famines, possible dates of occuranCe since 
1897 to 1981, and their local names. What transpired during the specific 
famines in terms of response and adjustment is considered from two points of 
view. 1. What the people of Kitui did to adjust to the specific famines such 
as pawning wives and daughters for food, migration etc. 2. What the 
(colonial or postcolonial) administration in the area did to assist the people • 
survive the famines through famine relief provisions, tax exemption etc. 
The second part of the paper consists of the results of a -district-
wide survey aimed at eliciting the people's perception of their environ-
ment, famine and famine relief. Thus, the descriptive (historical) and 
statistical data presented provide us with an assessment of past social and 
monetary costs of famine, especially in the provision of famine relief food. 
From the past Kitui experiences, two recommendations are made: 1. There should 
be a consistent famine relief policy which should be part of the already 
formulated food policy. This would have district variations and would 
consist of provisions such as famine monitoring machinery:. machinery for 
identifying local famine stricken families; transport facilities for famine 
relief: control of smuggling, price rises and hoarding. 2. Regional 
specialization of production, agriculturists living in symbiotic relationship 
with pastoralists so that drought need not give rise'to famine if food can 
easily be transported from other regions. 
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Owing ^cTthe fSet that the author of this paper was not able to proof-read 
the stensils, some typing errors which would significantly alter the meaning 
of portions of the paper have to be corrected. 
1. Page 1 paragraph 1 2nd word Eastern Kenya. Paragraph 2 line 8, 
4th word experienced. 
2. Page 4 2nd last paragraph line 1 nzaa ya maseng'enp'e. 
3. Page 6 paragraph 1 line 3 from bottom, last word sell instead of wall 
4. Page 7 last paragraph line 2, end of the line should read .... it can 
be concluded that the lack of use of the money. 
5. Page 9 paragraph 2, line 6 9 t h w o r d strategy of alleviating. Paragraph 3, 
line 2~lst sentence~should start with "First". Last'paragraoh line 5 
last sentence reads "The famine was therefore " 
6. Page 10 second last line on the page should start with "accumulate" 
7. Page 11 paragraph 1 line 2 2nd last word two instead of who. 
8. Page 12 line 1 should end "unpalatable" 
9. Page 13 line 8 from top ",.,.. parents contributed one bull or 5 goats 
s weekT Paragraph 2, line 5 from bottom 5th"word meagure~wage remi-
ttances from labour migrants, were the main sources of cash. 
10. Page 15 paragraph 2 line 10 4th word catastrophe. 
11. Page 17 paragraph 1 line 4 end of line - deleterious effects. 
12. Page 20 line 3 starts with should. 
13. Page 24 paragraph 1, line 10 after comma, should read "... but noting" 
14. Page 25 middle paragraph 2nd last sentence should read ......"In all, 
11,880 ten kilogram packets of katumani seeds were supplied to 1,188 
female groups all over the district". 
15. Page 29 line 5 from bottom of page, put quotation marks before ibid. 
16. Page 36 continues to page 38 while page 37 is actually 38 
17. The first reference attributed to Mbithi should be deleted > 
FAMINE, FAMINE RELIEF AND PUBLIC POLICY IN KITUI DISTRICT flj 
Our success in controlling nature gives us confidence, tha4- we shall 
eventually be able to control the social world in the same measure (Znaniecki, 
1974:i). 
Introduction. 
The subject of.famine is not a very popular one in Anthropological and 
Sociological literature, partly because famine has regular occurence.in arid 
and semi-arid areas of the world where affective research instruments are.still ' 
to be developed. However, with the increasing need to plan for and upraise the 
standards of the people living in such areas, especially since the most recent 
Sahelian drought and.famine, global and national attention has been re-focused 
to include arid and semi-arid areas. One such area of interest is Kitui Dlstric1-
of Eastern Province of Kenya. 
_ • From the earliest recorded and oral history of the Kamba people 
residing in Kitui district, it_is evident that they have experienced.cycles of. 
droughts and consequent famines arising from water and food shortages. In this 
area, famine does not therefore refer to acute shortages of food alone, but 
also of water for human and livestock consumption (Akong •a, 1981). The recur-
rence of such problems has transformed famine into an unavoidable, naturally ' 
caused vice and an institutionalized cultural phenomenon since some people's 
names and ages, major historical-events etc, take reference from the chrono-
logy of unforgctabl" past famines. -In fact, these are some of the culturally 
patterned ways-in which the memories of soecific famines are kept alive in 1 » j 
people's minds. 
According to Dirks (l980j, famins.has both biological and social 
dimensions with physiological and interpersonal implications* From the social 
point of view, there are three phases that characterize adjustment, to famine 
/ * 
conditions. When people first. learn of the onset of famine, they seek and 
give assistance through the culturally patterneS reciprocity networks. -The 
persistence_of famine..with the corresponding depletion of food resources leads 
to the.erosion of these networks. The family rather than the community 
become^ 'tbe unit of survival and beyond a certain limit, individualism and 
selfishness sets in when the survival of the individual becomes the goal. 
This is probably the"time when famine^related deaths have started occuring. 
This approach to the study of fam'ine'is^ "useful 'in recording the off cots .of 
famine on the population and the individual. However, without applying the -
1." This paper is part of "Drought, population dynamics and public policy: 
a socio-economic study of Kitui. I am indebted to Rockerfeller Foundation that 
provided the funds for the research and preparation of this pacer. 
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scbcme-fo specific famines, it would-be difficult tD know whether human 
response^ to all famines follow the same pattern. 
In..Eastern Kitui, discussion of famine~Tias centred on assessing i^s 
magnitude; social and-monetary costs; .and^wftat3 
prevent future famines (Mbithi and Winner, 192?? 1974). .One shortcoming of 
such an approach is the tendency to overemphasize the DOssibilities of increa-
sing production and productivity without realizing that the physical environ-
ment has many limitations. 
. _In this paper, I wish to merge_the two approaches focussing on response 
and costs respectively, because there is need.to get an impression of how people 
respond t0 famine situations in their attempts-to acquire food.and water. This 
has implications on the social and monetary costs of famine, especially in form 
of famine relief food. These t w o factors have implications on what needs ^o be 
done to eliminate famine and its effect,^ ., O'leary'.s descriptive method of 
studying famine (1979:84-97) is adopted as an effective way of reviewing the 
culturally significant famines experieone by the Kifui Kamba in recent times 
since 1892 to 1981. The aim in this oart of the paper is to isolate the percei-
ved causes of sDecific famines, what the people did to adjust to the famines 
and the measures undertaken by the Government to ascict the people to survive 
ThijLis in recognition of the fact that although literature on how people 
adjust to drought anc| famine conditions is available, "liftle has been written 
on food relief" (Porter, 1979:79). 
_ Tbe description of specific droughts and famines will be followed 
by a di-s^ussion of the results of a district-wide survey designed to identify 
people's perception_of their environment, famine and famine relief.. The_ 
descriptive* and statistic-.! data provide-respective historical and statistical 
bases for deducing governement policy associated with famine and famine 
reli-ifj and deriving what needs to be done in terms-of future government famine 
relief policy in tV>e district and probably the countr • as a whole*. 
Methods of data collection. 
The data used in writing this oaper was collected in Kitui in several 
ways:- _ . . _ . . 
1. -Scanning through files in the Kitui district archives in Embu and 
Kifui towns. 
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2. A standard questionnaire was administered to 345 heads, of households of 
whom 257(74.9^0 were male and_83(?5. S}o) were female. The majority of the 
questions on.the standard questionnaire were open-ended in nature designed tQ 
elicit tbe respondents* own categories. Although th~re are 5 administrative 
divisions in Kitui, namely Southern, Central, Eastern, Mwihgi and_Kyuso, the 
questionnaire was administered.in 6 regions* .Central division was.subdivided 
into Central and Western Kitui. The aim was to accomodate_any possible cultural 
and environmental differences. The distribution of the respondents by division 
was as follows J— 
Table 1 Distribution of respondents by division. 
Absolute Frequency Relative t-reguenc^ . 
.Southern 
C antral 
Eastern 
Western 
Mwiogi ( Northern ) 
Kyuso ( Far North ) 
67 
73 
"6 
66 
40 
19.4 
21.2 
22.0 
19.1 
11.6 
6.7 
345 100 
3. The last method of data-collection was holding thematic discussion?. 
with the oldest surviving members of the community, male or female. This was 
achieved by the principal investigator staying with a family, usually tbat of 
the in'erpreter/guide aad through familiarity in the community, heJd casual, 
unstructured discussions with people knowledgeable in the history of the Kitui 
Kamba. Such key informants provided detailed information on whatever they 
could remember about memorable, famines, their names, possible dates of -
occurence and what transpired during the specific famines as will be described 
in'the next section of this paper. 
Adjustment to specific famines: .a historical exe g^nls. 
Although oral.traditions suggest the occurence of severe famines in 
1836,^1868, 1670*. 1873, 1880, 1883 and 1888, for lack of adequate evidence, our 
discussion begins with the famine which started in.1P9? when the famine.referred 
to locally as Lwaya-allgator, struck central Kitui. During this famine, people 
hunted aligator for food because the wild game had disappeared from the f 
and caves because of a severe drought. 
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In the following year, the famine-spread to all_parts of-Kitui 
driving people to resort to diverse and desperate methods of adjustment. As 
a result, the faminewcame to be referred to severally depending on how the 
people in local areas perceived it. In Kitui central for example, it.came to 
be koown as nzaa gene or nzaa kubwa-big famine. Alternatively, it was referred 
to as ngomanisie-spread-all over or worldwide. Since 1898 was the same year 
that a colonial post was opened in Kitui town, the famine was unique in the 
history of the Kitui Kamba in several ways:-
1. _ The first colonial administrators in Kitui were able to experience it 
and as a result, accurate records of it were kept. 
2. - The colonial administration immediately-initiated moves to provide 
foodstuffs in selected market areas to be purchased and as free famine relist. 
r « 
The name of the famine became nzaa ya magunia-the famine of sacks (of food,. 
Rice was made available io Mumoni in northern_Kitui where the_Kamha from 
Northern .and Central divisions exchanged bulls for rice. Those ia Souther; 
Kitui, especially Kanziko location, trecked to Kibwezi in-f-fechakos to rscei'e _ 
free famine relief from a food depot that had originally served railway builders. 
The depot was now under-the personal charge of the local African District 
Commissioner (A.D.C.) as a famine relief centre for ..the region. Some of thi 
famine relief recipients trecked back to their homes-in Kitui with loads of 
food for their relatives there. The food was then used little by little by 
several families a s they trecked to Kibwezi to settle there temporarily. Ts 
journey from Southern Kitui to Kibwezi used to_take two weeks. In Southerr 
Kitui therefore, the famine cams to be kn&cn as n?aa ya mvunga- the famine f 
rice (which saved them). 
Some people would prefer to call it nzaa ya maseng'ng'e- the fami3 
of "cheap" wiues. The reference derives from a mode of coping with famineby 
which husbands or fathers pawned their wives and mature or underage daughters 
respectively, to men within.and outside_Kitui who could provide the rest f 
the family with food credits. The pawns were expected to be ransomed_by_fayment 
of cattle. Some of the pawns were of course turned into wives, others EsOned 
when the ransome did not seem forthcoming af^er the famine, while others vere 
actually ransomed info freedom. 
Pawning women as a mechanism of coping with a severe famine is 
historically not a phenomenon unique to the Kitui Kamba. John Middleton in his 
study of the Lugbara of Western Uganda observed that "Formerly there were --
_ p _ jQp /\\jp oo.r<, 
periodic fpminr= st k-JP and of '-he-dry season, recurring every J"en years or so + 
which can be dated by the marriages of "cheap" wives who fled from famine area= 
and were married in return for shelter" (1965:6). There .i= no. evidence from 
Kitui, tf-,a4- any of the female pawns were ever ^urned into slaves either within 
Kitui or in Kikuyuland where mo=t_of them were taken and where there are manv 
Kamba satellite villages and clans. 
Amber presents, a vivid impression of how people in Kitui responded ^o 
•'•his famine : -
Animals became a main source of food; g o a ' - s were held in store J~o be 
exchanged for grain, Men turned avidly tD hunting; large groups from bo^h side? 
of the Tana even met a-;- river '"O organize the~killing of hippos. All kind^ -
of wild f r u i t s and berries Became dietary 5 t a p p l e « , and small children s p e n t 
•' heir'days foraging for"these and '"Fie roots called hgatu that were prepared and 
eaten. Bu4- such actions were only e-t-op-gap measures; they could not possibly 
support people through famine lasting several year?7 Indoed, J-he tfadi^ioncr 
recall that people were soon reduced tD gating tfie. skins that they"slept on,' 
thoir quivers and even the urine soaked slings used tD carry babies (1977:?). 
Because of the hopelessness of the situation, the Kitui A.D.C. Mr, 
C.R»W». Bane accompanied a caravan of about 5,000 Kitui Kambas in search ..of food 
across river-Tena in Kikuyuland. This, traditional mode of coping wi+h scarcity 
was as successful as.usual. However, the strugglers_were attacked by people 
identified as <ikuyu, robing-them of the food they had so painfully acquired 
and carried. Angered bv this, Mr. Bane petitioned for a punitive-military 
expedition against the Kikuyu. Later, the Kamba were never harrarsed. What 
is not clear i<= whether ts-je Kamba had usually experienced problems in carrying 
food back hor.e from Kikuyuland or if it had been due to the severity of this 
particular f-vninc that had turned some people into thugs, waiting tD rob what 
rjthors had acouired through credit, barter o r a s gif-y=. 
- I'r the following year in 1899, smallpox broke out, decimating large 
numbers'of people not only in Kitui. but.also in neighbouring districts -
(Sorrenson, 1967:17;.' In the same_ycar, the r i n d e r p e s t which had been sweeping 
through the Maasai and Kikuyu areas finally converged in Kitui killing large 
numbers of livestock. Thus., by_a combination of drought; shortage of-food, 
water, and pasture; and diseases: many animal and human lives were lost between 
1897 and-1899. The surviving old men who were vouog at the.time remember this 
famine as unsurpassed by any o^hnr in ^ho known history of scarcity in Ki^ui. 
CO IV) 
A >\ H- H-rf cX C C H- H-
O O H- H-01 i cn •X c+ 
(j. H-Q q_ d- . 1 
P P 3 3 
_) 3 C C P P l-1 
-s CO CO a G • 
-X 
o 
3-
H M CO CO i-1 o <1 • 'l3 i * i { CD GO 
rn TO C i" H- "i p j- o I-' p O" •t- >a 7C X 
a. C i i c ^ ^ 
s i 3 o t re 3 X 3 ca m H-3 t- cr '.Q cr H- H-
co cq -f-
3 > 
.0 -13 --> 3 H-
^ 
s cn X .T H-a Q X X o 
p "i Q CL r—1 PJ CL C f) C s fj 0 p d X ^ V ^ CL 
^ • G a P .j- + c H X 3 • 3 
a -f) a P H q X „':. 
a _o 3 . r 0) X 3 h o H-X 3 G X G G S P S P CL P 
• CL H- P 03 M G 0 P o .1 ( 
•1 a H" -b 0) O '1 :fl tt P m H- d. a f-
+ o G a X n 
P 
< r*; 
H x H-:n 
H-0 
cr G 0 
1 
•n 
CD 
DL c 
IS ]_I, 3 35 
x 
H-
N 
a 
3 
P 3 
"D G 
O 'D 
G ^ 
CO 
I) 
X 
c 
A A ' 
rr 
CJ 
CO 
a 
x 
O p CL 
P 
O CX 
n to 3 CT 0 1 
X CO 
H> is CJ 
P :o 
3 H-o_ a 
P 3 O CL 
3 c 
"K C 3 P 
Q. cr G o "a p o 3 
+ '.0 
u t-f. o 
7\ TO H-Cf G •i G cs • i N b H- H-CS 3 CO 3 3 P o H-3 • f O X D- P G 3 "O a 
3 P • 3 H- ~r 3 G a 
CJ -1) 
c_ 
+ X 
A 
D-t—1 H-CO 0) 
— 
CD H-
+ G 
1- I-" 
X 
+ X CO 
X H" O 
X 
cr 
G P 
t 
X a 
to p CL 
CO 3 
CL 
zr CD 
H-3 CO 
H" 3 
GO 
en 
n o 3 a. 
t 
X G 
-ff 
O a .CL 
3 
A < 
N X 
O 
T 
O 
Q OL 
P 3 CL 
® i-S 
G p 
cr 
:n 
ii 
I—1 
P 
cq 
-0 
C £3 3 
H-
U jl 
O 
•-U 
CQ 
' 1 CD 
H-3 
ID 3 CL 
~0 
O o 
A. 
H-3 
t CT C3 
O. 
H-
'11 + 
H" 
O 
"1 a. 
H X 
CO 
3" 
H-cq 
3~ ;—I a 3 CL 
M 
a 
O fa 
H 
H" • 3 
N 
P 
•1 
0 c 3 a 
1 
T ; 
H-
O 
§ 3 
—i -b 
P a G 
^ H- 3 ro 3 n O r X .0 S G 
• P CO rt 
P H 3 H-X G h-1 CO + C M i) in G H- G 1" O c S rt p M. r+ CL -'c H- CO X O (0 3 G 1—1 CL c; CO H" P (—1 a f CL o 
3 X G G •f- o < p Q 
}- c 3 
X 01 X 
CD 3 G •i T 
G :n C -tj o 'i a ~s P 
G M* cn 3 TO ni :n P 
P 3 
a 3 O ft CQ 
CO 3 n 
3 Q U 
•J) c 
CO 
A 
f 
a 
H-3 a o "> t-
o -+> 
+ X 
ro. 
CL H-
JL t ^ H-O + 
x p a. 
:n o 3 ra 
p 3 a. 
X CD 
CO M CD 
CC-
T0 
H< 
H-3 7) 
H 3" ro 
X 
'CO CO 
ro P 
c» 
M • P :+ CO 
"i 
H-3 
CO I—1 00 
X CO 
-b 
p s 
3 a 
cr H-n X 
s p 
CO 
CO •a Q 
H-CO 3 
n co.. CL 
CO 7) C i-" X 
P -J 
CO p 
o -b 
O) • 
c 1-X CO "S 3 
A H-t-C H« 
a- 1_J ' CO a 
-it G a • c 
^ 1 
Cj 1 
CL ji c s a p 0 c 3 cq 3 a 7) c cq P 
Sl • 1-
O CL 
t X 
s P H-
3 y 
" 3 H- 0 J 1 
H 3" cr IX G H- c; 
<-i G -ll Q- 3 O 7) 1 O -j-a s ' X CJ G 3 M X G G O 3 •1 t !—' t X 
P 0 cq 3 
CO -b P H" 
( - 0' X '11 to! p X 
t O 
t P 
^ a C ra :n n CL G c G 
SI O 
b ' t -tj G a 0 -I) X P 
^ 3 
P) . 1* H-
J) X 3 
Q G 
p JI 0 c O H-
< 3 
G CO 3 O (J H* 3 G + M C 
' < H-O • H- ••s 3 O a M (H 01 a 
A c i J 
CO X h-1 
p CJ) 
'—> r J. 0 ro x 'CO X Q 0 ,0 —' a p G c ji c 0 CL CT 3 C G 3 3- O ' — ' C0 P H- ' t CO 3 H- m ;—1 a a N c CL 
"Jf S G ^ £ G 0 X s H a '"J P a H- P 3 G < H- G .0 1 n 1 P P X j 1 G "b H- 3 3 CO I-1 O 1—1 Jl CL G a i-1 P G + CD G cr P G — H- G 1—1 'A H- <n 1 f a. G CL a co p T r P CL n H-O O O r< G 3 LH* V < 
"+> • 0 [hj G p "b 2J c X 0 P 3 a [ 3 H- V- H" H- N TD 3 » J 
3 X 7C fO TD Q p G [ O a. 'n Cj •1 J: 
0) O a X "j- a -b 
+ G X s a H- 0 3 G ^ H- h cn ' m P < G G H- G A" H- 0 N ^ s 
La 3 s S O a 
3 X 
L~r a 0 -b H- H -b C H- '"J X G 
• f H- 3 G 01 H- 1 -t P G I-1 C t_i. ^ C O H- 01 cr a CJ 1 C CJ H- c 3 :n CO .X ji a X :t ' CL H-cq H- X f < 
r-1' 3 X 'n C", 3 t cq G 3 a X H- 3 SI O CD H- G G H- + G P CL ^ 3' 3 n cn co -b CO K 0 O O P P 3 3 G M - 0 n 
:t 3 JI 1 G • a 3 p • P M 3 O cn I H G 3 M X . 1 G CJ -b 3 X G CD G " < O) jl n 
< t -f* -b G H- CJ .T X S 3 P H- n H G a. 3 H-t X G H 3 X G ^ a 0 O G G -b G H- I-1 G ;3 s 
^ H- 3 -b |—1 X G O p G H-3 -b 7T 3 G G G — H- '1 P X 3 3 h G •q CL H-
\ c 
"0 3 P ;—i 
i-J D • 
X 
H" o 3" 
7T H-M M G 
CL 
3 3 3 
a CO o 
o 
( - 1 o 
o -b 
3" r. 
'1 CO P a 
o a W" 
P 
C": CL 
"O a TO c M 3) t-H-O 3 
"i ra 
TO ^ 
o c H-a. CO a 
£ H-
+ cr 
-h a c CD 
rx ro P 
T1 o M M O § H-3 CC! 
t 3" C0 
H-3 a 
ro 
p j) p 
3 q_ 
:x n 
a c 
f-cr "S n p A 
J- CT p H- a 3 3 c CL 
G cq i G 3 + P O -f-3 O" co G G 3 
< P 3 CT X .n G 
P • -b a G 
FJ • 1. H c X " jl X -b Ti CT CO CO 
G 3 0 
W H* 3 _) [ - 1 
G G H-3 H- 'jl ^ 1 •Jl O h M O P a. CL R—1 C Jl ft G a X 
G CO CL ^ H-
G ^ H- -b 3 G I-1 H-
< P- G r: 
Q. cn C • X F- r 0 
" O G A 
P H •'n P X 3 O 7\ CL 
:n H-
G M £ G H-
S + X O X O G 
X 1 X p iO a C •a 3 3 G O 0 G 3 
CO 0 -b K P Q 1 t "I 1- c 1—1 H* G 
G X CJ 
G t s Jl O p -
•'0 1 S t 
1 •. X M 1—1 X ,T1 G 
a (D hi H-
< ffi 
-tj w d 3 
.Q j r » c • 
3 
•s. 
( s .X 
o 
X 
n P 
< o CL 
B 3 
P 3 
n 
x H-
n x 
X a 
x P CL 
3 
CO 
S M 
.0 
CO CD 3 
H-.'t* C H-
P Jl C 
b H N 3 P P I-1 CO 
< O P M 
3 P • •—1 X P p 7C 
S CO 
y "b G 
.t t~> 
_ ) M a G 
-b CO P a. 3 H- p 3 CO TO CQ O 1 -b H-a CT !X Q P a 3 -b 'n n '—1 G O P -b S 
( n a H-
— X M • < G P A" T 3 N O S 1—r 3 CO 0 H-CO 3 
;._J 3 a a 
^ ' cn T 
13 -rl p X G t 71 D P O 3 -b G 
0) 
I 
O cn 
T) 
co CD CD CD 
• CJ H» a l\) O j.—j 
-b « ' U1 c • • -b * 
~b CD 
H- P t 
n + 3" ro 01 O CD CD 01 ( >"3 
H- 1" zr 
M • 
a H • CD H n H 3 i- C + » ;—r 07 0) t 3 cr 3 3 zr 0) "3 .7] PJ P P CD 3 o CD 3 CL 3 ' - < .1 P cr O 3" H- 3T 13 M M CD 01 3 p O 01 ( CD ' < H- < .t a 3 O CD 01 CD 
-* -b T Zf G CT ^ cr P < + o Pj_ g ZT 3 ZT 3 H> n 3 CD 3 H* 3 O Q cr t 3 ;—i 3 CL CD • CD 31 • • C I-1 CD CL n q a O 3 0) 3" >c a < H- T1-' i+ CL * 3 • P 
oi 
3 C CD -b i 3" CO ^ -j- H-CD 7T 3 3 + 3 CD 0 
0 -b • X... CD H- Q ID 3 
3 T T l 3 Ji 3* a • ^ H-O en H- CL H-a. CQ CD H-a. 3* CD CD 3 CD a 3 O H-H TD .~r O Q P CD H» -b < 
•< hr1 ~b 3" H- Q .V • -j-3 J1 f H- _) • cq w f 3 CD CD 3 CQ < 3" CD CD n CD C n oi f t CD I 3 •7) I 3" a P H- CD XD 3 . 1 i—> O 3 a ro O H 
* V. ro 3 C r J) a t -b 
CP n ro -b a CU CD 
< a a. :S H- H- H- H- H-TD 3 3 q 3 q cq cq JI tq ( a a 01 ! • P c r 3 -t n n 3" 3" CD 3" H- -f-CD n 1 0) 71 D" a n 71 1 ' T7 
a 01 1 • "a i i H H' n P o 3" 'n i H- <1 3 H" t + T H- 7) CD H" 0) I—1 3 n CD 
• 3 
'1 H« n 7T (H 3 
0 CD 01 0 01 
ZT 03 3 
P H" !—1H-
'a 
•'j 
o a 
i-zr P 
s fll 3 
3 
CB a. 
a 3 o 
tq CO 3 n 
-3 
CO ;—i H-Q -b 
-b • O a. 
i ;- 3 1 -b TD 01 m 3" H- a P CD rr V.U CD q f—1 O O rf-
1 H- TD O .+ 3 p CD 71 I-1 A" O i- -b 3" a Q 3 H- Q P CD a -b s 3 a 3 q + a CL 3 
/ J) e o + CD o CL • ro M P P i- -b q 5 3 H- t . t-01 B CL 3 3* t- c C P tq a 3" • -s n 
^ 3 r 3 P +• H* O a :n O" en a a P j> a o IT CD 71 H- p • a s -b 3 i H< s a CD P » ro . 1-p 
n tq 3 ro H> "t" 3" H--b P H' a -b P p i—i a q 7T C) c o • P H- a P a 3 3 • n s • H-ra -b 3" H-o H- 3 o P '-s M -b Q CD 3 a H- 3" -b a M1 < S) f H' a • 3" CD t CD n n P l--1 o -b + H- CL H- q 3 o p q '71 cr a. Q i—1 CT -b CD P a 7T O 01 a • CL q tq P f H- H-0) ( 3 H- 3" q 3 M .0 -t o q a 7) ta 07 T n p n p -h P p • 3 H- 3 + p' 3 < ro 3 H- 71 a CD "3 cr O H- c CL o M CD 3 CL 3 -b 
< CD + cr a f- H- P "t" o 3" ~b 3 n 3" 3" 3 .-i o tq 7T a CD LJ tv -b + 3" p CD c D. 1 c n • ( q 3 q S CD H- CD 07 ro q Q a 3 3" i—1 
rr 3" q 
cj-Q 
m 
•o 
w a a 
o 
I—i 3 P p ID CD CD • + c C vj Hi :n < ^ H-3 + CD n n a 3* a. 3" H 7' s -3 q P H-o 'n cr P t M 3" D H-' 3 3" -b P n ^ o -b .0 a ; l A" c P S p 'R-1-H- cq 3 P cq 3 • 3" H- '71 (D o a 3 CL 
cr —il TJ ij + CQ c t •77 (1- G q > G q 1 P 3- P 3 3" rt" a q -b G •"S a c O 3 ra a CD w G 3 
^ 3 H- t CD 0 O H- G 3 0 cr H- q 3* 01 1 M -b G) G 3 p T O H-3 3 CD 3- ^ H- 3 H- 13 a a 3 ' CQ q 71 ! CD q p 01 I P q H- < r M M 3 01 I t . h-1 3 G • 1 7C + T q h t O Q p cq 3 H-H- 3" H- CI CD ^ 3 O P-J 1—1 TD q H P" o q q c + CD G 3" A CL p h a 3 3 C A" -b ( a CD ~b O 3" 3 t G K 3 O + + • 3 H" P H- T a f—
1 
C 
7s 
3 71 Hi t P 3" 3 P -b to * • zr 71 H- "1" M I-1 H" 3 u !\7 a. H- • H- -J- CD '.0 CT 1 O n a q 7T 1—1 CD H- +• 
07 
3" q 01 D . j- ro H- 0 71 C H i r CD 3T zr f H- •Q 3 3 G .*+ H- 3" 3T H- C Q zr M CL P G O C zr CD ro CD "3 3 q .+ t 3" O S 01 n H- o 3 cq 0 0 <n H- H1 CD H" rl-q CO f—' 1 1 CL 3" r r G c - 3 G W B G i" ID b -< H- D D 01 f CJ 3 P CL n 01 CD n CD C 3 s ,-f- q 3 tQ ' S 
PJ ' j 
_b 
O 
H-
p 1—1 a 
rn M 
q 
CL 
G 
H" 07 C 
G 
P 0 1 G 
Q. 
O 
I—1 
D CD 'D 0 QL G .4 cq a 3 I-1 > j—j p O 3- c :n P ""j -b CD , C/1 O 3 M CL q r 01 f+ • 3 q I-J- q X ( S 3 i- zr - t 3" Q- Cj. cr c 0 rt- p O 
P H- T + 0 71 ' G G c c 3 < O 3 CL CL H 3 C ; 1 < H- H a < + CL G 3 a. CL 3" H- 3 ^ . zr CD CD 01 ( P H- P 77 cv -b G H- 3 a G H- CL 
+ >1 -t 0 1 P ro > G 3 P a 07 < 01 H- P -b c 71 f l -f h 3 O G G G • ?T P s 3 q 3" ro G "a C < 3 P .+ H- ro OL rt- "3 P H- i-1 a tQ G 
P H- ."t- ^ 3" 01 CL n G q I-1 G 3" 1—1 P < 3" rf p c 0 <; -+• co 01 a 3 CJ 3 P Z? S j—) H- p G p ' -.-(- • 
ai a C •-s P 3- P c i—1 0 3 3-
O r CL .+ CD H- G C7 C7 'K c ^ 
CD s -b 01 r ' J 3 CL O H- -J- s G H G 
o c -b ' " • t I 3 3 O CL p ~Y 3 c • 3 H* CD 3" 3" 7 C'i" 7- tq £ p :n H- CQ O n CQ ro CD C 3* 3 O C_ zr 
M 3 H- CD a a. G P T H- C .+ 3 P rf ro H" P - } - cr CL H- !—1 zr 3 a 3" 3 
-b M P p -f-CD Ml ro tq p CD G C -t-t a n 1 t- cr 0 3 • a. -b P zr H- I—1 -b 3 CL cr P 
'71 o CD O "3 < H- ^ a ro < + • '0 m a 3" H- > cq G 
C 71 1+ P g. t 01 H- H- G H- tq q 
! ' CD p- -}- a zr i 3 3 G 3 G P 
3" CL 3 3" ro -b tq 0 G 3 • + 01 
CD P CD p c G ^ CQ H- P -j-
1 -h 1—l "a r j c a. G 3 -t- 3" cr 
3 H- ro q G •-3 3 q H- tq H- P 
< CL 0 CD •a 3 P 3 :•) O G p -3 P 3- p 3 0 rq T G 3 r H- •j- c a q ^ G -f- -b H- -b tq 
•.T 3" 1 1 ro zr -f- a CT G zr 
c H ® p ^ CT 3 H- S .71 G 3 i - • < P :Jr H- P cr p ,-h M P G 3" ' ) 
3 H- ro q~ » CL 01 ( 3" § q • M P -b P CJ q 0 ^ « H- H- 3- G cr • H- CD 3 3 3 '3 3 H- a G + a '-i T" 3 P tq « n X C zr c 
pr a cr p 0 H- p '-3 :n ( 3" H- 71 G t-
+ a 0 CD .t .7 1 i" 71 (t-
3" a q t ^ t- a. H- p IT ( - + > cr CD ' 3 rf- p p c p Q 3 Q 3" G 71 * K C 3-73 3 n 3 c CD- CL G 3 S 0 
O H- CD ro . ro 7T n cq G P « P Q P "0 t" 
q 
zr 
il 
Q "3 r—1 p 
q 
CL 
fa
r 
7T 
O 71 
3-
+• G 
11 
CD tq 
a 
1 
ro 
'il 
CD 
H a 
c.o 
TD 
CJ CD 03 
- 8 - IDS/WP 3 88 
In an attempt io rectify the-situation, ""ax sollectioh-was postponed 
^o allow"the people.to face -'-he mos-u immediate problem": how to survive '-he.-
famine. The administration recognized '-ha4- the absence of •transpor/'iinfrapt-
ructural development was ~ major handicap in moving food into Kityi. As a 
consequence , chiefs.were hastly sen- t0 recrui4- able bodied men for road 
construction efforts. A-'- least,_300 men agreed tQ work on roe.d construction 
for fooc a4" the ra4'o of 21 pounds of maize flour, occasional 'meat, a a IJ" and 
Sh. 5 a month. Work for foo<| was unpopular kind of famine relief for which 
only a handful of the starving people presented themselves a'~ their own 
volition. The A.D.C, for example observed:-
They prefer to live"by ^heir own device which I"fear were the 
- pursuit of old law suits, cponging'on ""heir clansmen in Kikuyu 
and elsewhere, picking wild berries, digging up certain edible roofe 
and most frequently of all the hunting of wild game, especially-
elephant(4). 
Tba4" year, at leas'1" Sh. 30,000 was pO'jn4- on road construction with 
good fruits. The road bridge across A "-hi river, a cemcnt causeway across 
river Tiva and Ikutha in rou^hcrn Ki^ui on the Kitevezi-Kitui road, and -the 
Thika-Kitui road 'verc ..completed, This greatlv boosted the transportation' 
of food in^o Kitui district. Frorp northern Kitui in*-o the neighbouring 
Kikuyu distric^c-such as.Lieru. and Fmbu,.'-he_Kitui Kamba still used. the... 
traditional means of crossing river Tana. Usuallv, thr.ffood seeker= crossed 
•'•he river by holding.on t 0 a -f-igh4- rope tied on trees on either-bank. 
During the flood season when the water would 'be shoulder high as one walked 
across the river bed, those who were afraid called uoon.the services of 
expert swimmers who were too willing J-o ferry t-tiem across with their loads 
at a email foe. Such services are c+-ill provided even today. 
# § 
The severity-..of thaj-ocus4- menace led 4o the formulation and 
publication_of by-laws de-signed Lo oblige people Lo eradicate -'-he problem 
by any means_ 0n_June, 5 1929 for rxample, the locust rules were published, 
under the diseases of plants and prevention ordinance, making locust reports 
and destruction compulsory, Qn November 14, 1929^ the Hon. Chief native 
commissioner, inserted under s0ction_8 of "-he native authority ordinance 
"locust.destruction in all stages" as work which headmen in local'areas 
could issue orders. What most pcoplp did was to kill the locusts physically 
to cook or roast -f-hem for food. 
4. Kitui District annual report 1928. 
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_ _ Following the continued destruction crops and vegetation by 
locuc^-q, tbe A.D.C. advised peoDle tD start planting cassava.- Being a _ 
tuber, cassava would survive l o c u s t destruction. It would also be resistant 
to drought. 
The famine which was experienced in 1932 co=t >-he local administration 
Sh. 100,000 soeot on buying oigeon oeas and maize for relief food supplies. 
Tax ra'^ es in 4 southern locations were also reduced tD leave people with more 
money_wIth which tD buy food. After the famine, J"he A.D.C. Mr. R.J.C. Howes 
renues'ted for a nermanont agricul Hjral officer t0 be posted to Kitui J-Q 
improve methods of crop production as a long term strategy alleviating the 
famine problem. He noted -"hat "Even partial failure of rains results in a 
periodic threat of famine and until this threat it removed onco. and for all, 
progress in other directions is necessarily dslayed"(5). 
In 1934, some.famine was experienced-in some parts of Kitui as 
a result of two causes. First, +-he long rains of that year came late 
resulting into poor harvests. Secondly, the A,D,C» of Kitui at the time 
thought that heavy taxation in form of livestock as a form of disguised 
destocking process was to blame for the famine. Ix deprived many families 
of the alternative means _f survival. He observed; 
This famine"was a"very severe one as it was the culmination of a 
series of"poor seasons and reserves were exhausted, as also, I am 
sorry tD say, partly owing to J-ax„was '"he stock-wealth- of the majority(6). 
By the end of the year, 2,000 people had been employed to work for 
famine relief food cn public projects. The famine did not disappear completely 
that-yoar. When it resurfaced in 1935, Dcoplc realized that by collecting 
livestock bones,, they could sell them t0 Asian traders at various market 
enntres. The Asians would in turn sell them maize flour- The famine 
therefore referred to as nzaa ya mauindl- .famine of bones. According 
to 0'leary, £50,000 worth of food was made available in Asian shops to 
be purchased with the money received from the sale of livestock and 
livestock.bones. In that year, 20,698 head of cattle and 63,718 head • 
of small stock were exported on the hoof through-officially arranged 
auctions (0'leary, 1979189). _In addition to these measures, famine -. 
relief was provided at schools, despensaries and other public centres. 
5. Kitui District annual report 1932 
6. Kifui District annual report 1931-45 
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noted that unlike the Kikuyu the Kamba found the potatoes up-
palatable. Moreover, the maize and maize flour provided was 
quite unusual. It was red in colour. The famine therefore came to 
be called Eatune. 
Throughout the period of scarcity, most of the people 
working on public projects in the district opted for maize and maize 
flour in lieu of their wages. In the final analysis, it was 
found that famine relief to destitutes alone, had cost the local 
native council sh. 144,137.95 in 1945 and sh. 286,065.00 in 1946, 
An extra sh. 10,000 had been spent on feeding children attending 
school ( 0'leary, 1979:91). 
Between 1949 and 1951, there was another major drought and 
famine generally referred to as makonge. . During the famine, 
people in the district especially in central, western and northern 
parts made sisal-makonge which they sold to buy food. In soma 
areas, red maize flour was distributed as famine relief. The 
severity of the famine led the A.D.C. Mr, I(©lley to say, "the 
district was more dessicated than any other period for the last 
fifty years" (9). This was probably an exaggeration cn the part of 
the A.D.C. who was still new in the district and had probably not 
known the severity of the previous, more recent famines. 
It is in 1949 however, that there occured a radical change in 
the local administration's practice of intervening to assist people 
to cope with famine situations. That is, although maize was 
being imported from other districts at the rate of 2,000 bags a 
month for s.ale, Mr. Kelley was of the view that "as long as there 
are large numbers of surplus stock in the district, famine 
cannot be considered to exist" (10). It is this kind of "official" 
view which condoned drought and famine as blessings in disguise. 
9. 
10. 
Kitui District annual report 1951. 
Kitui District annual report 1952. 
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Mr. Kelley therefore eschewed famine relief supply for he 
considered it ''pauperization of the population". Such a policy 
of indifference to human suffering did not last for long. After 
C 11) the failure of rain for a fourth consecutive season , 
1) Food was stockpiled at dispensaries for free distribution? 
2) Free meals were provided to primary school children at 
their schools. The children were also given free maize 
flour if parents contributed one or 5 goats a week.' to suppliment 
the school diet. These measures were undertaken to prevent the 
collapse of the normal functioning of primary schools. 
3) In fact, whole families were permitted to work for food 
on darns and roads, the weaker getting light work. The aim was to 
use famine relief food supplies as a means of promoting long term 
development and to avoid the routinization of dependency attitude. 
d) The very poor and the old, incapable of work were admitted 
at dispensaries as inpatients till they regained strength through 
the provision of small doses of food. 
1 The next food shortage started to appear in different areas 
of Kitui in 1952 due to persistent droughts. In 1955, the April 
rains failed in the whole district, leading to widespread short-
ages of food, water and pasture. Largescale food imports followed 
and although no famine relief food was provided free, the imported 
food was transported to areas of severe food shortage to be pur-
chased. During the year? 30,000 head of cattle were exported on 
the hoof through official channels (12). Other exports such as 
117,049 goat and sheep skins? 102,858 head of poultry? beeswax? 
castor seed? hides? and rneagure wages remittances from labour 
migrants, were the main source of cash used by the people and £he 
local native council to buy food (O'leary, 1979;94). On their 
own, the people obtained food from their traditional sources in 
Machakos and Kikuyuland. 
The 1960-51 famine was a very unique one, not only in the 
history of Kitui but also Kenya as a whole. It was caused by the 
11. 
12. 
Kitui District annual report 1949-50. 
Kitui District annual report 1955. 
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combined effect of insect pests, drought and floods. First 
during 19 60, insect pests known locally as nguti invaded ?£itui 
district. They looked like grasshoppers, but they were definitely 
not locusts. They destroyed most of the green vegetation 
including crops. There followed prolonged drought in various 
parts of the district and country. The drought was so widespread 
and prolonged that the colonial administration in Nairobi became 
alarmed. This led to rain making experiments in the Rift Valley 
Province, especially at Njoro and Rongai where European Maize 
( 13 ^  and Wheat farmers had been hard hit. 
On July 27, 1960, it was reported that Baringo was one of the 
districts that would require emergency relief supplies. The report 
said? 
Over the past 13 months, organized stocksales have left the 
average Tagen and Njemps with little if any surplus stock 
with which to cushion themselves against famine conditions 
and the £uk have lost more cattle in the rinderpest 
scourge ( 14) 
The same was probably happening in other districts such as 
Kitui. For example on Friday, August 20, 1960, it was reported 
that 1,500,000 bags of maize would be needed in Baringo district, 
southern and coast provinces in form of famine relief. When 
it started raining in northern, central and eastern Kenya in 
(15) 
October 1960, it immediately started flooding . The short 
rains of 1960 and the long rains of 1961 became one long season of 
continuous raining all over the country. In Kitui, the provision 
of famine relief became necessary during the second half of the 
month of November 1960. The famine relief came from two major 
sources: yellow maize which was imported from the United States and 
the forces' famine relief consisting of powder milk for children 
in the district. 
13. East. African Standard, July 7, 1960. 
14. East African Standard, July 27, 1960. 
15. East African Standard, November IS, 1960. 
Since road transport was impossible due to the floods, 
helicopters were used to drop sacks of maize, maize flour and other 
relief items into villages. This is why it is remembered as the 
famine of n d e g e - a e r o p l a n e . I n fact, 40% of all the maize 
provided as famine relief in the whole country in 1960-61 came 
from outside the country (Mbithi and Wisner, 1972?5). It began 
a new era in the administration's policy concerning famine relief. 
All previous famine relief provisions in Kitui had been 
undertaken by the native local council, but now the central 
administration was involved. Secondly, it was probably the first 
time massive importation of food for famine relief from outside 
the country had been undertaken. Third, since it was a national 
calamity, it was probably the first time the Central Government 
machinery in Nairobi was focused on famine relief as an emergency 
operation needing quick decisions, coordination of operations 
and commitment to assisting the common person in the village. 
It was a national catastrophy which ought to have triggered-off 
immediate discussions on food and famine relief policies for the 
whole nation had it not been for the fact that this was a time 
when African political activities following the state of emergency 
had heightened and had been recognized by the colonial officials. 
This had probably left the white colonial officials unwilling 
to take radical policy initiatives. This was despite the fact 
that "Kenya (had) spent sh; 12% million on internally purchased 
maize and transportation alone" (Mbithi and Wisner, 1972s5). 
(17) 
The famine supplies were stopped in Kitui in 1962, 
only to discover that widespread provision of famine relief through-
out 1961 had resulted into an aggravation of the overstocking pro-
blem. The people had found it unnecessary to slaughter their 
livestock for food and to sell some of the livestock to buy food 
as they had traditionally done during past famine. 
16. Handing over report Mr. J.R.M. Tennent to J.F. Johnston, 
April 4, 1961. 
17. Handing, over report, Mr. A.D. Galton Fenze to Mr. Jc Shako, 
1962. 
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The conclusion to be drawn here is that the colonial officers5 
attitude towards pastoralism was negative. To them nothing 
good could be expected from the ownership of a large number of 
livestock. This, it has to be pointed out, was a misundertanding 
both of the local people's accumulated experience and of the 
weather conditions in the district which did not and to this day 
do not permit an individual family to rely entirely on agriculture, 
The people knew that in times of severe drought and consequent 
famine, a family with a large herd had better chances of surviving 
than the family with a small herd. 
During a severe drought large numbers of livestock die of 
lack of pasture, water and because of disease. A family with 
a small herd will definitely find it wiped out within no time, 
while a large herd is likely to be reduced in size but not wiped out. 
The remainder of the herd is then used as food or exchanged for 
food. It is therefore a pity that in some parts of Kitui, 
especially Kitui central, pastoralism is no longer a viable 
occupation. 
In 19 68, there was famine which was very similar to 
the one experienced in 1960-61 in terms of its cause. It did not 
come as a result of drought but too much rain. That is, in most 
parts of Kitui, especially central and southern Kitui, the short 
rains of November 1967 continued till April 1968 when the long 
rains are usually expected. To appreciate how continuous raining 
though without floods can cause food shortages, one needs to be 
familiar with the structure of houses and storage facilities in 
Kitui. Following the short rains of 1967, there was going to be 
a bumper harvest if the crop would have been harvested, but it 
was not. Most houses in Kitui are too small to be used for storage 
of grains as it is in Western Kenya. The crop has to dry in 
the fields before it is harvested and stored in granaries outside 
houses. Thus, as a result of continuous raining, the crop 
rotted in the fields. The result was a famine during which 400 
people received permanent famine relief food supplies. An 
" (18v additional 60,000 received occasional famine relief food. ' 
18. Provincial Agricultural headquarters, Eastern Province 
January 20, 1972. 
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Since 1968, the next severe : famine on which enough informa-
tion is available was experienced from 1970 to 1972. It was 
brought about by drought. Though it was a regional drought, the 
whole nation had been sensitized to the deleterious efforts of the 
1960-61 famine. As a consequence, when the occurence of the 
famine was first reported in newspapers, famine relief aid came not 
only from the central government but also voluntary organizations, 
a phenomenon that was unprecedented in the history of famine relief 
provision in the district. For example, between March 24, 1971 and 
April 17, 1971, 420 bags of maize was received from the government. 
Between April and July of the same year, 1,835 bags of rice and 
1 drum of edible oil was also received at the district offices for 
general distribution to famine victims. In June, Machakos Teacher 
Training College donated 130 packets of maize flour, while two 
months earlier in April, the Red Cross had donated the following 
items:- 90 packets of powder milk; 220 packets of dried vegetables; 
97 bags of maize flour; 200 cartons of baby food; 124 tins of meat 
and 55,000 multi-vitamin tablets. 
All the famine relief commodities were chcinneled through 
the District Officer's office to avoid duplication in the 
distribution process. The famine relief food was then sent to 
divisional and eventually locational centres for distribution. 
Urgent attention was focused on children who were provided 
with food at soup kitchens. By the end of the year, 37,000 
children were being provided with hot food at hot soup kitchens 
around the district. According to Mbithi and Wisner, the government 
spent sh. 20 million between January 1970 and January 1971 on 
national famine relief food, Kitui district included (197235). 
Following the famine, the Provincial Commissioner for 
Eastern Province made recommendations for the possible long 
term plans to combat famine and avoid massive relief food supplies 
in future;- > • w • -: • • 
1) Minor irrigation schemes covering 1,500 acres to be started 
in eastern Mwingi and Kyuso where famine relief supplies had 
been more widespread.: The problem with such a recommendation 
is that the availability, of water for human and .animal consumption 
is in such acute shortage throughout the year that the use of 
any available water for irrigation is like misappropriation of 
available water resources. 
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2) Katumani (hybrid, early maturing) maize seeds to be 
encouraged and emphasized over the local variety. 
c) Provide free seeds to ensure that people have seeds to plant. 
Lack of seeds at planting time is a serious problem experienced 
in almost all parts of the district every year. First, it is 
cue to the fact that most of the commodities are consumed in whole 
before the onset of the planting season. Secondly, due to poverty 
and the scarcity of income generating activities, people find them-
selves with no money to buy seeds during the planting season. 
In addition to the Provincial Commissioner's suggestions, 
the action committee of the Freedom From Hunger sent a dispatch 
to the P,C. requesting him to support the following suggestionss-
1) The use of fertilizers, pesticides and improved seeds. Such 
a recommendation in the circumstances of persistent droughts may 
not have been very useful since the problem being experienced was 
not poor crop yields but destruction of crops by drought. 
2) The use of simple agricultural implements such as jembes, 
pangas etc. This recommendation was probably based on the 
assumption that poor harvests in the district can partly be 
attributed to poor technology. 
3) The initiation of water development projects such as dams, 
pumps, pipes etc. 
4) The inauguration of nutrition education programms and small 
scale animal husbandry projects such as poultry keeping, rabbit 
rearing etc. These would not only provide mixed diet for most 
families but surpluses would also be sold to generate some income. 
5) The initiation of the concept of Kitchen gardens for the 
purpose of growing vegetables and fruits. This was a grand 
suggestion because from personal experience in the district, 
little green vegetables and fruits are consumed. The problem 
however is how to conserve water when it does occasionally rain. 
Vegetable gardens are possible on a permanent basis in very 
few river valleys, otherwise most of the rivers are seasonal 
and dry for most of the year. 
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6) Large scale animal husbandry projects to be started. The 
government through the Ministry of Livestock Development is 
currently actively engaged in encouraging commercial, co-opera-
tive ranching schemes in the district. 
Following their recommendations, the Freedom from Hunger 
sent Katumanj. composite B maize seeds to be planted during the 
April long rain season of 1972.^'^ The seeds were sent to all 
the districts of Eastern Province in the following measures 
Isiolo, 250 packets; Machakos, 250; Kitui, 200? Marsabit, 150. 
The 850 packets of maize seeds cost the Freedom From Hunger 
organization sh. 15,300. In addition' to the seeds, the following 
items were also s«nts~ Sh. 24,040 worth of fertilizers to be given .. 
only to Isiolo and. Marsabit? 20 bags of rose cocoa beans costing 
sh. 2,000; Insecticide worth Sh. 3,300? 100;pangas worth 
Sh. 520 and 100 small folk jembes worth Sh. 1,350. How the 
recipients of these items were selected or whether they were 
distributed free as expected, are questions beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
On September 28, 1372 however, it is the Office of the 
President which alerted the Eastern Provincial Commissioner of the 
existence of famine in Kitui and Machakos districts. Three 
factors may account for such state of affairs. First, it is 
a manifestation of the absence of drought and famine monitoring 
machinery in the districts and the country as a whole. Secondly, 
since local officials at districts and provincial levels are 
usually people from other districts, usually the so-called high 
potential areas, it is easy for them to take a famine situation 
for granted for it is difficult for them to differentiate between 
a season of plenty and scarcity. Thirdly, it may be a manifesta-
tion of the fact that there has been decentralization of administra-
tive machinery without the corresponding autonomy of decision 
making powers and the necessary staff competence. 
Though we have observed that during the colonial era, 
it is the local district native council which was usually res-
ponsible for famine relief supplies, it was probably due to the 
competence of the district officers in making appropriate 
decisions and plans that kept the central administration in Nairobi 
20. Kitui District archives at Embu, Agr. 11/21/Vol. vii/138. 
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from intervening. The finance may partly have been provided by the 
central administration but the decisions on what and how it 
shoul be spent usually came from Kitui district capital. Decisions 
made at lower levels such as this are likely to be more specific 
to the problem. The situation however, changed in 1960 and has con-
tinued to this day when apparently, the government officers at 
district level do not se^m to have the power and probably, the 
capacity to make decisions independent of the central government in 
Nairobi. According to Chitere "decentralisation of decision making 
necessitates Professional competence.....(and).... entails giving 
field staff not just authority to make decisions, but opportunities 
to actually excercsise discretion in discharge of their duties" 
(1980s 3 6). 
As a response to the alert signals from Nairobi concerning 
1972 famine - the District Commissioner of Kitui informed 
the P.C. for Eastern Province on October 23, 1972 that some 
cattle had already died due to water and pasture scarcity. This 
was proof that the drought and famine had been in existence for 
a considerable length of time. In a dispatch of November 23, 
1972 to the Ptrmanent Secretary in the Office of the President, 
the D.C. for vIitui asked for three thingss~ 
3. Famine relief food. 
2. Katum-.ni maize seeds for those who could not afford to buy 
it; The seeds were to be planted that month. 
3. To in luce people to plant cassava as an insurance against 
persistent drought and famine. This was an unfortunate request 
because it is the D.C. but not the Permanent Secretary who is 
with the people and should encourage them to plant certain crops. 
It is diffijult to get an impression of the magnitude of the 
famine due to lack of information on how much famine relief was 
j-c.cc ived, 
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Due to the failure of the April rains of 1975, famine broke 
out, necessitating famine relief food supplies. From May to 
September, a total of 3,300 bags of maize is recorded to have 
(21) 
been received as famine relief food in Kitui. Hot soup 
kitchens were also set up at Kisasi in Kitui central where the 
famine was viewed as more a cute. Here, 1,200 mothers and 
children were served with porridge consisting of maize flour. (22) milk and sugar on July 29, 1975 alone . 
Persistent drought and poor harvests continued into 197£, 
necessitating a request by the D.C. to the Permanent Secretary 
in the Office of the President to consider assisting people 
with seeds to plant in November of that year. 
21. 
22. 
Kitui District archives at Kitui li/21/vii/1975. 
Kitui District archives at Kitui ll/21/vii/201 . 
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The famine relief budget for seeds sent to the Office 
of the President included the following items 
Table 2: Projected famine relief seeds, July 1976 
6,000 packets of Katumani maize 
2,000 bags of beans 
6,000 bags of millet 
3,000 bags of sorgum 
5,000 bags of cowpeas 
2,000 bags of pigeon peas 
2,000 bags of castor seeds 
Cassava for bulking 
Transportation of cassava sticks 
Total projected cost 
Sh. 162,000 
• 440,000 
360,000 
150,000 
750,000 
440,000 
100,000 
50,000 
80,000 
2.53 2.000 
The above budget was revised and integrated into the 
provincial famine relief seeds estii ~iates as shown below •• 
Table 3: Eastern Province : f am i ne relief estimates October 1976 
District Katumani Sorgum Millet pigeon Cassave 
Maize serevrn bullrus h peas (lorryfulls) 
(bags) (bags) (bags) 
Machakos 1,000 500 500 140 • 7 
Kitui 1,000 500 500 140 6 
Mb ere 60 60 50 60 2 
Tharaka 60 60 50 50 o o 
Isiolo 35 50 50 rz 1 
Marsabit 50 50 30 5 1 
Total 2, 215 1, 220 1, 180 400 20 
Total 
cost Sh.201,700 12,200 115,500 22,000=471,400 120,00 
There is no record showing whether or not the Office of the 
President responded to the request for seeds by sending any 
seeds or money for the seeds. 
The figures available 'for the 1976 famine in Kitui 
however, are sufficient food for thought. They have a bearing 
on the future food situation in the district and probably 
the nation in general. For example, by November 30, 1976 the 
following relief food had been received in Kitui. 
23. Eastern Province, October 1975: Famine relief seeds 
estimates. Kitui District archives. 
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Table 4: Relief food supplies in 1976 
Month bags of bags of grams of powder 
maize beans butter kgs. 
January 3,900 500 1, 250 
February 3,500 500 
March 8 ,000 1 ,000 21,750 2,600 
April 8 ,000 600 
May . 8 j 000 200 
June 8,000 500 
July 8 , 000 — 
August 8,000 1 ,000 
September 8 ,000 T_ ,000 
October 8,000 
Total 71,400 5 ,300 21,750 3,850 
Among others, the voluntary organizations which responded 
to the situation in Kitui were the following:-
1. National Christian Council of Kenya which gave 21 bags 
of powder milk; 1,000 mattocks, 1,000 shovels and 200 oxploughs. 
These items were sent through the office of the D.C. Earlier 
on February 14,1976, they had channeled 33 ploughs and 66 
OA chains through the office of the President • 
2. The Presbeterian Church of East Africa donated 263 bags 
of maize; 10 bags of cabbages; 3 bags of beans; 2 bags of millet 
33 cartons of maize flour and 75 baskets of dates. 
3. The Catholic Relief in Distress gave food for general 
distribution valued at Sh. 64,580; Sh. 70,980 to the school 
feeding program and seeds worth sh. 15,540. 
4. The Anglican Diocese of Mount Kenya Donated 20 bags 
of maize. 
5. Moyale District in Uorth Eastern Province pave 30 bags 
25 of maize 
Over the same period, the government sold 8,594 bags 
of maize and beans to Kitui prison, hospitals and the school 
24. 
25 . 
Kitui District archives at Kitui, ll/21/viii/331 
Kitui District archives at Kitui, ll/21/viii/349 
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feeding program. By December 1375, the government had increase 
relief maize supplies from 8,000 to 10.000 bags a month, and 
beans from 1,000 to 1,500 bags a month. The food was being 
distributed at 20 sites selected by the district development 
officer. At least, 290,000 people were getting famine relief 
food on a permanent basis. 
As the situation continued to worsen all over the 
district towards the close of the year, the D.C. instructed all 
the Vocational officials to make a thorough investigation and 
draw up locational registers of starving people needing food 
relief. The registers revealed that 378,735 people that is, 
180,673 children and 198,062 adults needed food relief. The 
figure would have been bigger if the registers from Ikutha 
and Voo would not have been found missing in the Kitui District 
Archi V6S Si t Kitui. In fact there must have been exaggerations 
in these figures, but not in that the population of Kitui 
during the 1969 census was 3^2,953 26". and 463,512 in 1980: 2 7 • 
it can easily be concluded that nearly every resident of Kitui 
district needed famine relief food. The cost of providing 
such food was enormous. For example, it is known that by 
December 28, 1976, the chief accountant in the Office of the 
President had paid out Sh.2,177,560.25 towards famine relief 
food for Kitui district alone. The question which such famine 
relief figures suggest is, if at least three districts in Kenya 
had famine of the magnitude Kitui experienced in 1976, would 
the nation find itself with the food, and transport facilities 
capable of coping with the problem without depending on outside 
donors? Such a question is extremely disturbing in view of 
the panic which gripped the nation during the 1980-81 national 
famine to be discussed later. 
Evidence shows that the December/January harvests 
were not adequate to wipe out famine from the district. The 
manager of the maize Produce Board was therefore instructed 
on. January 18, 1977 to release 4,000 bags of maize to the D.C. 
of Kitui. On March 10,1977, a further 3,000 bags were ordered 
26. 1063 Kenya populations census. Government printer 
27. Ministry of finance and planning, central bureau of 
statistics. Kitui office. 
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into the district. -On March 31, a similar amount was also 
received, indicating that famine was still wodespread. On April 
15, however, 30.0 bags of maize were released, not for distri-
bution. but for purchase at subsidized prices. On April 2,1977 
the government suggested the following seed requirements for 
the people of Eastern Province for planting that very month:-
28 Table 5: Seed requirements in April, 1977 
The Crop Kitui Marsabit Isiolo Meru Embu Total 
Millet 600 10 - 50 50 710 
Sorgum 400 20 - 100 600 1120 
Cowpeas 400 5 10 20 30 465 
Katumani 5000 600 600 1500 600 8300 
Green grams 400 20 8 60 50 538 
Beans 300 10 8 50 100 468 
It is probably due to the difficulties experienced 
in trying to identify the famine stricken people deserving 
free seeds that the local administration identified Mwethya 
female self-help reciprocal groups as the best medium for seed 
distribution. Most married women belong to one or the other of 
these groups. Thus, by October 18, 1977, 1,198 Mwenthya groups 
had been identified. They were advised to pr'epare their gardens 
in readiness for planting in November. In all, 11 188 female 
groups all over the district. The distribution on the divisional 
level was as follows:-
Table 6: Seed distribution to Mwethya groups in Nov.1977 
Division Number of groups Number of packets of Maize Seeds 
Central division 644 6,440 
Southern 69 690 
Eastern 72 720 
Mwingi 355 3,350 
Kyuso 68 680 
Total 1, 188 11,880 
These seeds were provided on' condition that after the 
harvest the same amount would be returned to the district store 
to be re-supplied. What was overlooked here was that Katumani 
28. All the figures are in bags of 90 kg each except for 
Katumani maize which is given in packets of 10 kg each. 
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being a composite seed, would rot be re-supplied without first, 
selling it and buying fresh seeds. The expected short rains 
actually came ana there was a good harvest which did much 
to alleviate the deleterious effects of famine. 
Three years later in 1980 and 1981, Kitui was caught 
up in another famine which affected directly or indirectly 
nearly every : Kenyan. The famine was caused by the combined 
effect of drought, hoarding and smuggling across international 
boundaries. First, the November 1979 rains failed in some 
parts of Kitui. This was followed by the failure of the April 
1980 rains all over the district. By this time people in the 
northern locations were already starving, In July, what was 
recognized as a national calamity was already having serious 
consequences in Kitui, which together with Turkana are the two 
districts that received some free famine relief food. The food 
consisted of yellow maize, wheat and rice from the United 
States and other friendly nations. 
According to a report in "The Standard" of March, 7 
1981. The League of the Red Cross spent Sh.2'i5 million between 
October 1980 and March 1981 in providing famine relief food in 
Turkana and Pokot districts where there were 8,000 people 
permanently receiving daily food rations. For most of 1980 and 
1981, the European Economic Community has speht enormous amounts 
of money on providing famine relief in Turkana with the result 
that till now, December, 1981, many people in the district 
are still permanently herded together in famine relief camps.. 
In Kitui, there were no massive famine relief food 
supplies comparable to the situation experienced during the 
1976-77 famine period. This implies that most of the food 
imported from outside the country was rationed to traders for 
sale. According to one district official, the district was 
° Q receiving 1,000 bags of yellow maize a month as famine relief 
It was allocated by the government through the Kenya Farmer's 
Association store at Kibwezi. More Maize, packets of Maize 
flour, wheat flour and rice were coming in for sale through whole-
sale traders appointed as government agents. The traders bought 
29. Personal communication. 
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their rations directly from Nairobi and sometimes Kitui town, 
When the commodities became available in Kitui, they were 
sometimes sold at exhorbitant prices on the black market not 
only because this would fetch the traders more money but also 
because they needed to recover the high transport costs they 
had incurred. The second alternative was to sell the commodities 
close to market centres to minimize transport costs. 
Investigations carried out in December 1980 revealed 
that unscrupulous traders licensed by the D.C. to make basic 
food items available could take them to eastern Kitui at night, 
where they could exchange one. bag of maize costing' sh. 100 at 
government controlled price for 4 adult goats, each costing 
a minimum of Sh.200. Packets of maize and wheat flour were going 
at twice the controlled price in some areas far away from 
market centres. 
Realizing that there were serious problems in getting 
food commodities where they were needed, and that when these 
were made available, they were at prices villagers could not 
afford, the district officials instituted very stringent measures 
of control. An agent could be given the license to go and 
buy foodstuffs only if he had signatures from the local 
councillor, KANU chairman and the chief. When he made the 
commodity available in the local area, the same officials had to 
ensure that he had the exact amount he had been allocated at 
the store. They then supervised the selling of the commodity 
Similar controls were applied to the distribution of free famine 
relief food. Through such measures at least 75% of the foodstuff 
provided through the government machinery for sale and as famine 
relief reached their destination. Because of the extreme 
pain people experienced in looking for food to buy, the famine 
was nicknamed nikwangwete - I die when I posses (money). 
The Catholic Secnetariat through their local offices 
at the Kitui Parish Centre participated actively in the provision 
of famine relief for the 1980-81 famine. This was partly 
be cause 1. They receive and provide such aid on. behalf of donors 
from outside the country. 
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2. For convenience,, they have established permanent 
infrastructural facilities at the level of the Dioceses 
(district) for co-ordinating local church groups for the provi-
sion of aid to rural programs such as water projects, hospitals 
and clinics, educational programs such as women groups and 
marriage counselling, and of course in the provision of famine 
relief food. Their aim is to raise or maintain the standard 
of living of the people of the district, catholic or non-catholic. 
During the 1980-81 famine period, they had two famine 
relief programs in operation. 
1. Food for work 
Those who were famine stricken as identified by the 
local catholic church leadership provided some physical labour 
on community programme such as terracing, road construction, 
building churches and schools etc in order to be given famine 
relief food. Thus between. February and June 1981, 10,764 
bags of rice each containing 100 pounds and 2,946 cartons of 
cooking oil, each containing 6 gallons, were released for 
distribution under this program. The food was provided by 
the churches in. the United States as emergency famine relief 
food. Otherv/ise, food for destitutes is usually received frcm 
the catholic church institutions outside the country twice 
every year. 
2. Food for mothers and children 
Over the same period as noted above, 3,687 bags of 
nice and 3,563 (25 kilo) bags of powder milk were released 
for distribution under the food for mothers and children program. 
This program was instituted in recognition of the fact that 
Kitui district is generally poverty stricken and when famine 
strikes, mothers and children suffer most. 
In general therefore, it can be concluded that the 
past history of the food and water situation in Kitui does not 
paint a bright future for the district. For example, the 
"Daily Nation" of August 26, ,1981 quoted the Provincial 
Director of Agriculture for Eastern Province as saying that with 
the exception of Meru, food production in the Province has been 
on the decline. Of course, the problem is that when drought and 
famine strike, they neutralize any progress previously achieved. 
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Theoretical and Policy Perspectives 
The statistical and descriptive evidence given, 
strongly contradict Wisner's hypothesis that famine in eastern 
Kenya, Kitui included, is man-made; a product of regional 
growth and income disparities. It also contradicts his view 
that "Vulnerability of drought has increased in close association 
with the development of the settler economy in Colonial Kenya, 
and Subsequently the Africanization and expansion of the 
economic relations established under Colonialism" (1977:194). 
First Kitui district was a purely native district where 
settler agriculture was eschewed, probably due to its dryness 
and because Kamba pastoral practices would have impeded settler 
agricultural development. 
Secondly, drought and famine being natural, unpredic-
table phenomena, how can they be associated with settler 
economy and africanization? As Feckholm observes, "droughts 
are an unavoidable aspect of the arid environment. Though they 
cannot be predicted with any precision, they should never come 
as a shock" (1975:142). Thirdly, considering the evidence 
already presented, what the colonial and Post-Colonial admini-
strations have done to assist the people of the area is enormous.. 
Thus, if Wisner's hypothesis were true, then the solutions to 
the problem would have been simple, but are they? 
Kitui being a semi-arid district, the famine problem 
is environmentally related. "People try to plan against the 
hunger season, but they are usually unable to prevent its 
occurence" (Ogbu, 1973:33). In this, the Kitui Kamba are similar 
to other societies residing in similar environmental conditions 
because "local Conditions often do not permit long-range 
subsistence planning in these societies. These conditions 
include the ecological limitation, on the amount of food that 
each family can grow ( and harvest) at any given time (ibid). 
As a result of these environmental limitations the. v aterial 
standards of life of the majority' of the people is low. This 
implies that people are usually able to invest in capital assets 
if there is adequate or surplus food. 
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Cultural perception of adjustment to famine 
In a district wide survey carried out between 
September and October 1980, during the most recent famine in 
Kitui, 345 heads of families were asked whether they thought 
there would be crop failures in the future. The responses 
were as follows: 
Table 7: Possibilities of future crop failures 
( and famines) 
Yes 
No 
Don 1t know 
Total 
Absolute frequency 
241 
21 
83 
345 
relative frequencey 
69 .9 
6 .1 
24.1 
100 
The majority of the people in the sample i.e. 69.9% 
indicated that crop failure and as a consequence, famine are 
recurrent problems in the district. A quarter of the responde-
nts (24.1%) however, could not commit themselves one way or the 
other. This is because it would be tentamount to predicting 
weather conditions, the factor which is predominantly responsible 
for crop failure in the district. , 
Asked to say why they thought there would be more 
crop failures in the future, 258 responses were recorded in the 
following proportions: 
2 , 
o 
5 
6 
Table 8: REASONS FOR FUTURE CROP FAILURES 
There have always been crop failures and A.F. 
famines once every 2 years. 81 
Rainfall is unreliable and unpredectable 82 
Poor farming facilities 20 
Destruction of crops by birds and 
Monkeys 6 
Too much rain destroys crops 2 
Climate has changed and crop failures 
occur often. 3 
It is Cod's Will 7 
There has been overgrazing 52 
Total number of responses ~23F 
R.F, 
31.4 
31.8 
7,8 
2.3 
0.8 
1. 2 
2.7 
22 .1 
1 C 0 — 
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From the above figures, 31.4% of the responses 
idealize crop failures and as a. result, famine as a phenomenon 
which recurs with a regular pattern. They believe that every 
after two years, there must be'a severe drought. Alternatively, 
there is a belief that two consecutive seasons of bumper harvests' 
are usually followed by a season of crop failure. 
The first two patterns of response in Table 8 account 
for 63.2% of all the recorded responses for the question. This 
implies that the people perceive the circumstances which are 
responsible for crop failure as natural and as such, beyong 
human control. When the respondents were asked what they would 
do if they were warned of a future crop failure, the pattern 
of responses was recorded as below. The question was asked 
with the historical knowledge that in Kitui, crop failures 
have always been followed by famine. 
Table 9: What people would do if warned of crop 
failure. A.F. R_;_F 
1 Stay and see-persevere 45 .1.1 .6 
2.Migrate to a better area 6 1.5 
3.Stop wasting time tending the farm 5 1.3 
4.Save money to buy food 25<4 65 .5 
5.Improve farming 15 3.9 
6.Sell livestock to buy food 46 11.9 
7. Look for a job 17 4.4 
Total number of responses 388 100 
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The above responses confirm our earlier observation that 
crop failure in Kitui is perceived as a natural occurence which man 
cannot prevent. This does not however mean that people do not do 
anything aimed at making them survive the famine. Even the 11.6% 
of the responses which indicate that people would stay and see, do 
not mean 'that the people would sit around waiting for their fate. 
Following a crop failure, people's efforts are focused primarily on 
searching for food arid water. In response to the above question for 
example, 65,5% of the people would likely start saving money to buy 
food. The major source of money in Kitui is the sale of livestock. 
A person who owns livestock is not only likely to survive a severe 
drought but is also able to pay school fees for his or her children. 
He or She is also able to afford the other necessities of life 
required by the family. For example, out of the 345 heads of 
families reached during the survey, 25 9(75.1%) own livestock; 
75(21.7%) do not, and 11(3.2%) did not respond to the question. Of 
those who own livestock, 176(6 8%) sold some between January 19 80 
and September when the survey was starting. The livestock were 
sold for the following reasons: 
Table 10: Why people sold livestock 
A.E. R.B. 
1. To buy smaller livestock .for.bride-
wealth • • • 1 2 4 . 3 
2. To stock a business 3 1 
3. To buy essentials 153 54.3 
4. To pay school fees 79 28 
5. To pay for medical care 13 4.^' 
6. Others, eg. pay debts 2 2_ 7.8 
Total number of responses 2 82 100 
The responses suggest strongly that agriculture should 
not be viewed as an alternative to pastoralism as the colonial 
administration in the area used to think. The two should be 
advanced and developed as complementary occupations- agriculture 
as a source of food and livestock as a source of cash. 
One would have expected that in an area where crop failures 
and famines are reccurent, any harvest should all be stored. This 
would be true only if there were adequate alternative ways of getting 
money for other things. When asked what the family did with the 
last harvest, the following responses were recorded. 
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Table 11: What the family did with the last harvest 
A JT_. R.F. 
1. Stored all 191 55.4 
2. Sold some 67 19 .4 
3. Gave away some . 8 2.3 
Gave away some and sold some 72 20.9 
Total number of respondents 345 100 
The above table shows that although the majority (55.4%) 
of the people stored all the harvest, all would have done so if 
it had not been for two major reasons: 
1) Selling some of the harvest for money to buy other things; 
2) Abiding by the principles of reciprocity by giving some of 
the harvest to relatives and friends. However, following a 
crop failure, most people (71.4%) get food by buying it. 
Other sources of food are as mentioned in the table below:-
Table 12: Sources of food after a bad harvest 
A.F. R.F. 
1. Buy food 320 71.4 
2. Work for food 25 5.6 
3. Get famine relief 18 4.0 
4. Sell livestock to buy food 32 7.1 
5. Get help from relatives 34 7.6 
6. Other 19 4.2 
Total number of responses 448 100 
The evidence already presented indicates that adjustment 
to crop failure and famine are specific to given environmental 
resources and as such, are culturally specific. In the discussion 
of specific famines, it was "also observed that the strategies 
employed in adjusting to crop failure and famine change with 
specific droughts and famines as the available resources change 
and as new ideas of increasing food supplies'evolve. 
As a result of persistent droughts and famines in the 
district, people are generally poor, with low material standards. 
A,sked to indicate how crop failures have affected the people of 
\ 
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Kitui, respondents gave the following responses: -
Table 13: How crop' failures (famines) have affected the people of 
Kitui " " " 
A.E. R.F. 
1. Mot much 5 0.9 
2 . Poverty increased 133 25.1 
3 . Social disorder 70 12 .6 
4. Temporary migration 60 10. 8 
5 . Permanent migration 114 20.6 
6 . Children drop out of school 3 3 . 6 
7. Loss of livestock 57, 10. 3 
8. Depopulation by death 76 13.7 
Total responses 554 100 
It can be concluded from the above table and the earlier 
description that lack of adequate food and water supply have.had 
far-reaching effects.on the population. Some of these effects- can 
be viewed in their own right as adjustments to conditions of 
scarcity. The majority of the, responses (25.1%) for-example, 
indicate the existence of general poverty. People go in tattered 
clothes;, take one or two meals a day, a factor made worse by high 
food prices during famine. We can imagine this resulting into 
poor health and little motivation for work. 
, Permanent migration aimed at moving out of the location 
to another or out of Kitui district altogether,.and temporary-
migration to look for food or pasture both account for 31.4% .of 
the responses. Among those who do not migrate, petty crimes; 
inter-and intra-family conflicts; broken homes, early marriages 
especially for underage girls; rural and urban prostitution 
increase. Children from poorer families, especially those with 
no livestock to sell drop out of school, not only due to lack of 
school fees and uniform but also for lack of food. Human and 
livestock lives lost as a result of drought and famine related 
effects cannot easily be'measured. As noted in the description 
of the specific famines, the government usually comes to the 
people's aid in times of severe famine. The people's perception 
of government aid can be evaluated by the analysis of the question 
requiring respondents to say what the government does when there 
is crop failure. 
- 35 - IDS/WP 388 
Table 14: -What the government does when there is a crop failure 
A.F. R.F. 
1. Controls prices 81 14.3 
2. Transports food to nearby places 104 18.4 
3. Provides food relief 289 51.2 
4. Any other 5 0.9 
Total number of responses 56 5 100 
The pervasiveness of previous famine relief supplies is • 
recognized by 51.2% of the responses. 18.4% of the responses 
recognize the government assistance in making basic foodstuffs 
available in shops, while 14.3% indicate that the government 
controls prices. In fact, the very mention of the latter two 
factors while responding to an open-ended question is suggestive 
of the problems encountered in obtaining food in shops. 
When the respondents were asked to name any other desir-
able assistance needed in the area, the responses recorded touch 
on the indirect and infrastructural government assistance which 
can alleviate some of the deleterious effects of food'and water 
scarcity. A summary of these is in the table below:-
Table 15: Other desirable (government) assistance needed in Kitui 
A.F. R.F. 
1. Build food stores 9 1 .1 
2. Provide free farm inputs ' 81 10 .2 
3. Provide free (tap and irrigation) water 239 30 r\ . £ 
4. Provide free boarding schools 117 14 .8 
5. Provide farm credit facilities 44 5 .6 
6. Improve transport facilities 100 ' 12 .6 
7. Build hospitals and clinics 127 16 .0 
8 . Any other 75 9 . 5 
Total number of responses 792 100 
People's perception of what is needed indicates a general 
lack of 
1. Water facilities such as dams, rock catchment barriers., weirs 
and tanks. 
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2. Medical facilities such as hospitals, health centres and 
clinics. 
3. Security for school children, a factor which demands the 
introduction of boarding primary and secondary schools to minimize 
school dropouts and to cushion the student's against starvation. 
4. Transport facilities such as roads and bridges. Across most 
of the dry river valleys, there are cement causeways which make 
those valleys impassable during the rain season. 
5. Farm inputs such as implements, seeds and technical advice 
especially on extensive'dry farming practices . 
The provision of credit facilities and building food 
stores are not viewed as very significant, probably because of 
the high risk of crop failure. Recovery of loans or capital 
invested would be difficult. 
Conclusion and Suggestions 
From the experiences of the Kitui Kamba therefore, the 
most logical conclusion to be drawn is that there is need for a 
national famine relief policy. Suclfi a policy would have provisions 
for local district variations. In Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1981 
on National Food Policy, article .1.6 emphasizes increased food 
production and distribution of basic foodstuffs. There is need 
to recognize that when forecast food production targets cannot be 
met as it happened recently in 1980, contingency measures of 
sources of food, the tyt>e of food, where it .is acutely needed, 
how it is to be transported and distributed, need to be identified 
and planned for in advance. 
The suggestion is that a national famine relief policy 
should in fact take into account the following factors derived, 
from the Kitui experiences:-
1. Relative regional or district specialization in production. 
Predominantly pastoral districts such as Kitui, Turkana, Samburu, 
Kajiado etc. should not be encouraged to practise marginal'agri-
culture as an alternative to pastoralism. This is likely to 
increase desertification and expose the populations'living there 
to more environmental hazards. Marginal agriculture should be 
increased in the future when breakthrough in arid area appropriate 
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greed, thus holding the population at ransom on a life and death 
issue. 
5. This is why detailed transportation provisions in the suggested 
famine relief and the already formulated food policies should be 
spelled out. Thus, famine need not be a logical consequence of 
drought as is usually the case in Kitui, if adequate supplies of 
food can be effectively moved into drought stricken areas. 
6. It is therefore suggested that in each district, famine 
monitoring committees consisting of local church leaders, K.A.N.U. 
officials, Councillors and peasant farmers who hold no official 
positions in government should be formed. The committees should 
be as independent as possible from the normal government function-
aries in each district. When a local famine emerges, the local 
district famine monitoring committee should alert the D.C. who 
probably through the P.C. should get into contact with the Office 
of the President and the Ministry of Agriculture for famine relief 
food and other appropriate assistance. 
This process has the potential of preventing a situation 
similar to what happened in 19 7 2 when it was the Permanent 
Secretary in the Office of the President in Nairobi that alerted 
the P.C. for Eastern Province of the existence of famine in Kitui 
district. Since the committees would have prior knowledge of 
what is needed, how much, where it is needed and who should get it, 
aid from the government, voluntary.organizations, companies and 
individuals would be channeled through them. Through their super-
vision and monitoring machinery smuggling, hoarding and overchar-
ging of foodstuffs would easily be detected, prosecuted and as a 
result, controlled. Similarly, through proper accounts, decisions 
would be. made about what to do with the surplus famine relief 
supplies 
According to Dirks ''nearly every year a food emergency 
occurs somewhere on our planet, and,, despite regular recurrence, 
there is an unfortunate tendency to deal with each one on an adhoc 
basis, particularly in coping with human needs that arise'7 (19 30+ 21 > 
This is the situation that has existdd in Kitui for a long time 
which now demands a consistent policy to govern adjustment to 
drought and famine. In the formulation of such a policy, "Policy 
makers should recognize cultural mechanisms of coping with famine 
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technology will have been achieved. For the moment, pastoralism 
and marginal farming should be practised as complementary occupations. 
2. Predominantly pastpral districts lose alot of livestock during 
severe droughts. If some of the livestock were bought through 
government or co-operative agencies to be fattened and sold in 
predominantly agricultural areas such as Western and Central 
Provinces, the pastoral regions would receive grains in exchange 
through similar channels. Such measures would ensure the availability 
of markets for both grains and livestock. Such a program would 
probably lower prices of some of the food items such as- me at since 
the program would cover all corners of the country, parts of which 
have not yet been reached by markets external to the local area. 
3. Regional specialization in production and sale of food commo-
dities would call for a national survey aimed at making an inventory 
of the food resources available in each district, what the staple 
food is and therefore, what the people in the district would need 
as a survival foodstuff during famine. Currently, there is an 
assumption that everyone in Kenya would be comfortable with,maize 
flour. This may not be true especially of the pastoral communities. 
M-. The historical Kitui experiences strongly suggest that the 
whole population cannot depend entirely on government famine relief 
supplies during a severe drought. The government is limited in 
providing adequate, regular amounts of food supplies. Relief there-
fore suited for the critically famine stricken families. The other 
families are better off if they are left free to resort to recip-
rocal kinship, friendship and credit facilities that are culturally 
conditioned and regulated In acquiring food for survival. Many 
Kitui Kamba families for example', have survived' past famines by 
acquiring food through channels outside the district in Meru, Embu, 
Machakos and the coast. If such links are served by the govern-
ment through the closure of district boundaries, thus prohibiting 
the movement of foodstuffs as it happened during the 1980-81 national 
famine, then many of the peonle who would have easily survived the 
famine by resorting to these channels are exposed to undue hardships. 
The closure of boundaries in 198.0-81. was probably aimed 
at curbing smuggling and was do e with the assumption that the govern-
ment had assumed the responsibility of transporting basic foodstuffs. 
The Kitui experiences however, strongly demonstrated that the govern-
ment' s good intentions can easily be deviated to serve individual 
/ 
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situations''' (Morris, 1974: 1855), so that the people remain 
relatively in control of the survival strategies. As Morris 
suggests, "considerable effort should be focused on development 
and expansion of self-insurance schemes that require a minimum 
of bureaucratic discrimination'" (1974:1855). This would minimize 
dependency on government supplied food resources. 
Thus, instead of contending that famine relief provision 
is ?;one of the few occasions when the poorest segments of society 
are able to get something from the rich''. (Morris, 1975:288) stop-
gap measures such as this one should be integrated into long term 
strategies of attacking the causes of food shortages so that the 
problem can be eliminated. Thus, the suggested food and famine 
relief policies should not dwell on the problem alone as it has 
usually been in Kitui, but should also focus on long term food 
resources and on the minimization .of the impact of drought and 
famine. This Is why it is suggested that the famine relief policy 
be part of the national food policy. 
> * 
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